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**Cultural and Science Diplomacy in the early 21 century:**  
**Can we talk of a ‘Practice Turn’ in European Policy?’**

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**Introduction**

The European Commission is developing a strong interest in both Science and Cultural Diplomacy (SCD). Indeed, both have played an increasing role in the European diplomatic story in recent years. The most recent evidence is to be found for example in the release of the 2014 Preparatory Action report on Culture in the European Union’s External Relations, *Engaging the World: Towards Global Cultural Citizenship*, which provides an extremely detailed analysis of the growth of European cultural diplomacy. The increasing flow of reports from the European scholarly and policy community on the growing importance of enhanced collaboration in science to meet real world global challenges (see for example the outputs in *Horizon Magazine* and various outputs from the [European Commission](#)) tell a similar story. The last Annual Report of the President’s Science and Technology Advisory Council (STAC), *The Future of Europe is Science* (STAC, 2014) the Commission’s *Horizon 2020* research programme and the activities of the External Action Service (EEAS) further

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reinforce these trends. And the EU-Commissioner recently even stated that “As part of my own commitment to make European research open to the world, I will continue to develop EU science diplomacy at every opportunity” (Moedas, 2016);

Yet for a long time, as a scrutiny of major works on diplomacy within IR scholarship attest, analytical attention has not specifically focused on either science or cultural diplomacy. SCD while they may have existed, especially in the age prior to the global technological and communications revolutions, lived in the shadow of political and economic statecraft that have been the core tools of diplomacy that, according to Cohen (2012) can be dated back to at least 4.500 BC. Neither of the two recent, and best, scholarly collections on diplomacy (Kerr and Wiseman 2012) and Cooper, Heine and Thakur, 2013) have specific chapters on science or cultural diplomacy.

There is recent work on science diplomacy (see Ruffini, 2015; Davis and Patman, 2015; and Shermer, 2015) but not work that specifically engages the systematically with theory of international relations. As a consequence, it is difficult to judge the direct applicability of either classical or modern theories of IR to the study of SCD. As a consequence, it is one intention of this paper to address a theoretical lacuna in IR scholarship and specifically to articulate a direct theoretical and applied link in the study of SCD towards a so-called ‘practice turn’ in international relations.

This lacuna also exposes the limitations of our understanding of science and cultural diplomacy as public policy, noting that we understand public policy here not simply as the traditional ‘foreign’ elements of policy of a given state but rather as what is increasingly understood as ‘global public policy’ (see Stone and Ladi, 2015.) An evolving strategy for the development of science and cultural diplomacy is not well developed and the conclusions for policy that might be drawn from a theoretical articulation of the ‘practice turn’ remain to be fully articulated, as do the longer term implications of the continued development of cultural and science diplomacy in today’s fast changing multi-polar and digitized world.

The paper will identify the growing academic interest in taking ‘practice’ as an increasingly privileged unit of analysis in the study of international relations and especially diplomacy—in contrast to the traditional privileging of actors, agents and structures (see for instance Neumann, 2002; Adler-Nissen, 2016; Adler and Pouliot, 2011; Bueger and Gadinger, 2015 and Bueger, 2014). Interestingly, as noted by both Neumann and Adler-Nissen, much of the

inspiration for the practical turn within IR scholarship comes from the wider study of scientific practices (Schatzki, Knorr Cetina and von Savigny, 2011).

In this paper we argue that SCD should be regarded as *praxis* in international relations and the ‘practice turn’ become an increasingly theoretical set of lens through which to analyse science and cultural diplomacy. This will allow us to look at SCD from a different theoretical perspective than has traditionally been the case in IR scholarship. It is also a perspective that offers a stronger methodological context for the analysis of SCD. This in turn can provide a framework for more precise comparative study of specific initiatives in cultural and science diplomacy and the development of SCD as an increasingly salient foreign policy instrument.

## **International Relations and Diplomacy: A Theoretical Context for Framing SCD**

### ***(i) Diplomacy Then and Now***

Historically, diplomacy has invariably been seen as the narrow preserve of diplomats acting on behalf of rulers and later foreign ministries and built on habits of secrecy and ‘deceit’. In the words of a former Israeli foreign minister diplomats would conduct their work under ‘the cloak of darkness’ (Eban, 1983:331). Nowadays, both practitioners and scholars have a more subtle and complex understanding of diplomacy. We are now resistive to the proposition that diplomacy is simply a narrow foreign policy practice of the modern Westphalian state system. Rather, as we will argue, contemporary diplomacy is recognized to be a much more wide-ranging and flexible set of *human practices* and behaviours that are adapting in a range of ways to the newer conditions of the globalized era and the new and varied range of actors that are participants in that era.

As is now well understood and documented, the 20<sup>th</sup> century saw a shift ‘from nation-based diplomacy: from a traditional, hierarchical model (to) a more diffuse and pluralistic network model’ (Hocking, 2005: 150). The locus of authoritative policy-making in the executive branch of state government, with its distinction between the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ of the state, has gradually waned. During the late 20<sup>th</sup> century, two parallel and mutually reinforcing, developments have turned the situation on its head: (i) the borders between domestic and international politics have become more and more blurred—a cliché but true; and (ii) diplomacy has become increasingly ‘societized’. It is no longer simply the preserve of a

specialized agency of executive government. It has broadened to include international and regional organizations, sub-national governments as well as the whole panoply of non-governmental actors. As such, one can say that the realm of World Politics today is a much broader phenomenon than just inter-national relations between sovereign states. And this is dramatically changing the practices of multilateralism (Van Langenhove, 2010).

Accordingly, this shift from a state centric approach to one stressing a multi-actor, ‘hybrid’ approach to diplomacy (Spence 2015) involving also the practices of non-state actors, regional organizations and sub-national regions requires a revision of the way we both theorise and practice diplomacy. It requires new, dedicated, intellectual avenues for interdisciplinary discussions among scholars and policy-pundits alike.

This theoretical rethink does not occur in a vacuum. Strong structural changes in the global political economy have engendered the emergence of a new model of statehood: notably the growth of the regulatory state (Jayasuriya, 2004) characterized by dispersion and decentralization of centers of political authority, the growth of intense and hybrid networks of public and private subjects (Slaughter, 2004 and Stone, 2013), the fragmentation of the national economic space and the diffusion of power to various regulatory organizations and structures in civil society that have all been influential in the evolving nature of diplomatic practice. Indeed, the very nature of many contemporary trans-sovereign policy problems nowadays challenge the narrower definitions of foreign policy that focused exclusively on the realm of sovereign ‘high’ politics associated with questions of national security. Nowadays, the so-called ‘low’ politics of economic statecraft, and much science diplomacy, operate in highly technical policy domains spanning not only economic, but also societal, issues that increasingly dominate the day to day international agenda.

Throughout the policy cycle—from initiation and agenda setting through to implementation and evaluation—and across different policy fields social and territorial pluralism demand new political strategies, that in turn demand change in national bureaucratic and organizational administrative practices. Nowadays, diplomats are no longer members of an exclusive (mandarin) elite who, in the words of Sir Henry Wotton’s old canard (1604), were ‘... sent to lie abroad for the good of his (sic) country.’ Rather they are much more public servants trained in a wide variety of both generic and specific managerial and administrative skills and practices to be used in the resolution of complex policy problems both at home and

abroad; but also, and perhaps even more often, in the day to day resolution (or not) of problems of an administrative process-driven nature, albeit with a trans-national flavour.

Actors in international negotiations are thus no longer simply and exclusively state representatives. New diplomatic actors have emerged both from within and outside of the apparatus of the state. The label 'multi-stakeholder diplomacy' has been used to highlight the increasing involvement of a plethora of non-state actors in diplomacy. Diplomacy is no longer simply the stuff of state actors engaged in inter-state relations. It is also the stuff of regional organizations, trans-national policy networks, regulatory communities, sub-national regions, NGOs, foundations, civil society actors and other private subjects engaging in diplomatic games (Cutler, Haufler and Porter, 1999; Higgott, Underhill and Bieler, 2000). We can also find significant individuals engaging at times in what Cooper (2007 and 2014) terms 'celebrity' diplomacy'.

Specifically, there are now well over 800 active international and regional organizations. The majority of them are not part of the UN system. Many of them are not household names but they deal with highly specialized and technical matters of international policy.<sup>3</sup> There is also a growing array of international associations, global public-policy networks (GPPNs) or transnational policy networks (TPNs) and transnational public-private partnerships. Additionally, global task-forces are convened to address pressing cross-border issues. These can be official conferences or they can be privately convened. These public and semi-public decision-making venues act as magnets for scientific advisors and analysts (see Ilcan and Phillips, 2008.)

In addition, there is a diverse but growing assemblage of consultants, foundation officers, corporate leaders, NGO executives and other professionals who proffer their services on the international stage. These transnational policy professionals hold power as a result of their (semi-) official position, their technical expertise and control of information and often lengthy international experience as career officials and consultants. They function in conditions of increasing bureaucratic complexity in national foreign ministries, international organizations, universities, semi-autonomous R&D agencies, numerous international NGOs and professional associations, amongst others.

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<sup>3</sup> Randomly examples could include the Food and Agriculture Organization; Global Environment Facility; International Commission on the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas; United Nations Atomic Energy Commission; World Health Organization; World Intellectual Property Organization.

These changes have also presaged a change in the role of the traditional nation-state diplomat as this diversified plural policy environment becomes that of a ‘boundary spanner’ between networks and nations, and an ‘enabler-facilitator’ of different groups of actors undertaking what Andrew Abbott refers to as the hinging of different ecologies (2005). A recognition of these different ecologies gives rise to major theoretical and global policy issues in the theory and practice of diplomacy as an enduring but evolving institution seen as an assemblage of norms, roles and behavioural practices in the good ordering of global society. But, the core practices of diplomacy as an institution—communication, a representative function, and the ability to mediate and reproduce knowledge by policy diffusion and transfer, albeit now under conditions of globalization—remain (Jonsson and Hall, 2005.)

The new diplomatic practices as well as the old core practices extend to both cultural and science diplomacy. Understanding these practices is essential if we are to mediate between the competing tendencies of the universalism of science and the particularism of cultural practices, some of which can threaten the very basis of a cooperative contemporary international society. In essence then modern diplomacy is not simply a matter of great events and great people (usually men) negotiating agreements and making treaties. It is also about embedded, or nested, practices and interactions of an everyday technical, social, practical and ritualized kind that strive to enhance and legitimize international society (see Der Derian, 1987) and have given rise to the practice turn in the international theory of diplomacy.

### *(ii) A Practice Turn?*

The social sciences in general and international relations (IR) in particular are partial to the occasional new ‘turn’ in both theory and applied analysis—for example we have seen discursive, linguistic, practice and policy turns in a range of different areas in recent years. Some are more significant than others. We would like to suggest that the practice turn in the theory and practice of diplomacy is one to which close attention should be paid. Building on the major changes in both theory and global circumstance identified in the previous section, and drawing on some recent theoretical literature, especially the work of Iver Neumann, Rebecca Adler-Nissen and Vincent Pouliot, we argue that the practice turn in both the theory and practice of diplomacy should be taken seriously. At a theoretical level much of the hard work has been done for us. Neumann, in rebalancing the asymmetric relationship between discourse and practice, moved the study of diplomacy beyond the linguistic turn to anchor it

in the study of practice understood as ‘socially meaningful action’ that helps us bridge the intellectual gaps between language, structure and agents (see Neumann, 2002: 627-8 and also Adler-Nissen, 2016 88-89).

As a consequence we see practices in contemporary diplomacy in this paper as both actions and social relationships transcending the sometimes overly determined divide between structures and agents. Traditional structuralist analysis alone does not allow us to understand fully the political dynamics of diplomacy. To do this we must also have a rich empirical grasp of the practices that give that politics shape. In this context, agents still matter but their behavior, on a practice reading, is only in part determined by the structural environments in which they operate. This environment necessitates that practices in diplomacy, notwithstanding habit driven elements, are invariably exercises in improvisation that reflect the behavior of others. And let us not lose sight of the fact that it is agents that ‘practice’ and in so doing create the ‘socially organized ways of doing things’ that gives meaning to action (Pouliot, 2016: 3 and Adler and Pouliot, 2015). But practices is much more than simply ‘habit’. In Neumann’s words (2002: 631) they are ‘socialized patterns of action’. It will be an argument of this paper that in the development of European science and cultural diplomacy we are seeing the evolution, and in some instances consolidation, of new socialized patterns of action.

This strand of theorizing requires a change in methodology. Specifically it requires a more ethnographical and anthropological analytical approach that resonates with some, but not all, discursive and social constructivist analysis (again, Neumann, 2002 and Adler-Nissen, 2016). But most importantly, it represents a major contribution to the manner in which we can analyse diplomacy in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. In advancing such an argument it is not, however, necessary to accept Pouliot’s grandest claim: that the practice turn allows us to ‘endogenize’ structure and agency. But it does give us an important new way to look at how diplomacy operates in all its modern day differing and multiple levels of social and political complexity (Pouliot, 2016:5).

Clearly this strand of theorizing is appropriate to diplomacy as a ‘meta-field’ (Adler-Nissen 2011, 327) in which the traditional agents of diplomacy—states and their representatives—are joined by that whole panoply of networks and other private and non state actors from corporate and civil society that are now active participants in all forms of diplomacy. Nowhere, we will suggest, is this widening domain of actors as important in modern

diplomacy than in the domains of science and cultural diplomacy. The empirical narrative of SCD reflects an importance for the role of non-state actors beyond that found in almost any other issue-area of diplomacy.

In this context we need to see diplomacy as a foundational, but hybrid institution of modern society providing practices and procedures for contemporary interaction and transaction. This proposition is increasingly recognized by state bureaucracies around the world where, notwithstanding financial pressures, efforts have been redoubled to enhance diplomatic capability amongst many of these alternative actors across public, private and wider civil sectors that have international dimensions to their portfolios but which traditionally were not thought of as diplomatic actors.

### ***(iii) The European Perspective: Then and Now***

The previous generalized discussion of the evolution of modern diplomacy and the privileging of the practice of agents over structure has implications for the specific empirical focus of this paper: that is contemporary science and cultural diplomacy in Europe; and both their actual and potential utility as instruments in the projection of the EU as an actor in global affairs. It is the argument of the paper that EU SCD must be seen not only in the wider changing conceptual context of modern diplomacy as identified in the preceding section, but also as a response to the constraining empirical context of in which EU external policy has found itself over the last decade and in the contemporary era. The growing interest of the European Commission in general and the EEAS in particular in SCD needs to be understood in the context of EU, attempts to formulate a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) more generally.

A call to exploit SCD, implicitly at least, is a call to re-assert, earlier assumptions of Europe as a ‘normative power’ (Manners, 2004) in the wake of a decade-plus period in which the both the European Union and the continent as a whole has been troubled, and continues to be troubled, by a series of major economic, socio-political and military-strategic setbacks. Let us consider what we might call these ‘then’ and ‘now’ scenarios.

***Then:*** The 2003 *European Security Strategy* (ESS, 2004) brimmed with confidence about the EU’s achievements and its ability to make the world a better place. The ESS was an upbeat, self-congratulatory, statement stressing Europe’s ‘soft power’ (Nye, 2005) strengths—namely its democratic values, the manner in which it offered a voice for smaller members, the

success of its economic integration model, its cultural breadth and depth, its support for multilateral global trade and development agendas and a commitment to a rules-based international order. It saw these strengths as effective foreign policy tools for a *confident* normative power (see Söderbaum and Van Langenhove, 2006; and Telò, 2014.)

*Now:* Sadly, the experiences of the past decade—especially the global financial crisis, the continuing Euro zone crisis and their effects, the failed Arab revolutions, the Russian occupation of Crimea, intervention in eastern Ukraine, the birth of ISIS and the increasing problems associated with the growth in the number of migrants and refugees crossing the Mediterranean—show that the EU’s national governments still find it hard, and sometimes undesirable, to operate a common policy in the international domain. Initiatives that involve the recourse to traditional instruments of foreign policy in Europe’s international relations, including forceful and coordinated diplomacy, more often than not reflect divisions rather than agreement over policy leading to sub-optimal policy outcomes.

Skeptical pundits revel in the disconnect to be seen between Europe’s global aspirations and its current problems—epitomized in the ‘end of Europe and the rise of Asia’ line of argument (Mahbubani, 2011 and 2013); an Asia, for all its own problems is portrayed by such analysts as more patriotic, less selfish and less short-termist societies when contrasted with Europe, ‘the political dwarf’ (Mahbubani, 2008). As others have similarly argued:

The identity crisis in Europe has been exacerbated by the rise of Asia. Admiration for – and nervousness about – the extraordinary achievements of modern Asia has brought Europe’s own uncertainties about its place in the world into sharp relief. Europeans are unsettled by the fear that the Asians will challenge and eventually overtake them. No longer is Asia just a limitless supply of hardworking cheap labor. Europeans fear that Asian technical brilliance may overwhelm them in the very areas of strength they have prided themselves on (Green, 2015).

To be sure, the cultural legacy and contemporary influences of European science and cultural diplomacy remain impressive. Europe still counts for “almost a third of the world’s science and technology production” (EC, 2014b: 8). But there is a European crisis of confidence and identity in face of diminished global expectations. This is particularly so when compared with the assertiveness of less than a decade ago. In its growing interest in science and cultural diplomacy Europe seems to be searching to rebuild some of the aspiration and optimism that prevailed in the early 2000s. The assumption that science diplomacy and cultural diplomacy can contribute to this rebuilding is a rational assertion. In the face of these challenges,

making the best of assets such as Europe's culture and its science can become crucial instruments of policy to be harnessed and enhanced when and wherever possible. Indeed, articulating and developing science innovation and cooperation and harnessing the strength of Europe's cultural heritage to positive diplomatic ends take on an importance way beyond initial assumptions. Specifically, leveraging cultural and science diplomacy to build bi-lateral and multi-actor relationships as well as informal and formal global networks as a source of power and a policy tool takes on much greater importance in the contemporary era than in the more optimistic times of a decade ago (see EU, 2014a: 21).

The impact of the economic crisis, the changing patterns in the global distribution of economic and political power and increased skepticism towards the European project in the face of its numerous contemporary crises places contradictory demands on those who would make and implement EU foreign policy, not just in the domains of science and culture, but across all issue areas. Demands for greater coherence and effectiveness in EU foreign policy, captured in the creation of the EEAS and its boosters desires for 'a European Diplomatic System' (see Bátorá and Spence, 2015: 4), confront national desires (and not just in the UK) to retain or claw back national controls on policy. In this context the opportunities and challenges of enhanced coordination in both cultural and science diplomacy, between the EU, its members and their extra-European partners takes on a public policy significance for collective European action not normally attributed to either science or culture.

The EEAS also points to the necessity to enhance the external dimension of science and research policies. "International cooperation in research and innovation supports the Union's external policies by coordinating closely with enlargement, neighbourhood, trade, CFSP, humanitarian aid and development policies and making research and innovation an integral part of a comprehensive package of external action" (EC, 2012: 4). Again, a similar argument for cultural diplomacy is picked up in the 2014 *Preparatory Action Report on Culture*. This is rhetorically all well and good. Unfortunately the problem, unspoken of course, is that the EEAS is not acting with the authority of a sovereign person. It is not a foreign ministry for a sovereign power.

As a consequence, the degree to which the EEAS will play a major role in the development of a specifically European cultural and science diplomacy will depend two factors: (i) the degree to which cultural and science diplomacy are deemed to be central to a state's diplomacy—and this will clearly differ from issue to issue and (ii) the degree to which states are prepared to

‘outsource’ policy from their foreign ministries to the EEAS. While the rhetoric on both science and culture is strong, the likelihood of this happening, especially with the major European states, should not be overestimated. At least two foreign ministers from major countries—William Hague for the UK and Bernard Kouchner for the French were on record in the early years of the EEAS as saying they would never outsource the promotion of their own interests to it (Spence, 2015:58). Rather than see EEAS as a policy coordinator they see it as a potential, but only potential, amplifier of their voice on selected issues. Certainly in the UK, ambivalence and suspicion has been the watchword to-date (see Fiott, 2015: 75) although the UK’s, and indeed France’s, position must be contrasted with the more instinctively integrationist position of the Germans (see Adebahr, 2015). Although for all countries the role of the EEAS is to add value not substitute for existing activities.

While the European Commission and the EEAS have, to-date, played an arms-length role in the everyday processes of cultural and scientific collaboration and inquiry, the Horizon 2020 Research Programme, in contrast to earlier Framework Programmes, has become much more *explicitly directional* in its encouragement of greater international cooperation. As it says: “Science is more broadly a means to raise awareness among elites in third countries on EU values, visions and priorities” (reference 1 here). It openly urges a more directly coordinated discourse around science and cultural diplomacy. This contrasts with the traditional, organic, less formalized understandings of scientific collaboration that had developed in second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Similarly, the EEAS is becoming much more forward leaning in the utility it sees in the role of culture in EU foreign policy. In the words of Federica Mogherini the High Representative, ‘...culture has to be at the core of our foreign policy...We should not be afraid to say we are a cultural superpower’ (<https://amp.twimg.com/v/dae668ff-969b-4776-9d1a-c0ac3aedc3c5>).

### ***(iii) Science Diplomacy and Innovation***

Science is not only embedded in most aspects of our daily lives, it has also always been international. Principles and institutions of modern science were laid out and established before the birth of nation states while the ideal found in the *Republic of Letters* (Daston, 1999) equated the scientist to a seasoned cosmopolitan traveller. Science and technology (S&T) are the embodiment of our quest for knowledge and understanding and will remain so in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Science here is used broadly to mean not only what some call the SET subjects (science, engineering and technology) and others call the STEM subjects (natural and

physical sciences, technology, engineering and mathematics), but also stretching to the behavioural and social sciences. There is a well-documented history of science (and cultural diplomacy) by the major powers, especially during the Cold War, which need not be re-told here (but see Royal Society, 2010: 11-14; Ancarani 1995; Flink and Schreiterer, 2010; Smith, 2014; Davis and Patman, 2015; Henriksen, 2015; Wang, 2013; Ruffini, 2015 for reviews).

In the post-Cold War era, and prior to the creation of the EEAS in 2010, the EU had already begun to take steps to develop and expand its collective diplomatic expertise; especially into post-Communist Central and Eastern Europe and key states in the Islamic world, initially Turkey and later the Middle East and North African (MENA) states more broadly. In other parts of the world, especially East Asia and Latin America, the EU has been assertive in demonstrating the utility of its own model of integration and cooperation (Higgott, and Timmerman, 2008; Telò, 2007). While this was seen principally as an exercise in economic integration, cultural and science diplomacy formed part of the collective regional and inter-regional model the EU advanced (Stein and Ahmed 2007.)

This growing salience of science diplomacy is exemplified in the activities of a number of coordinating groups both within government and within the world's scientific communities. *Primus inter pares* are the American Academy for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) and the Royal Society of the United Kingdom (RS). The Royal Society boasts that its position of 'Society Foreign Secretary' dates back to 1723 and the AAAS has recently (2008) created a *Centre for Science Diplomacy* with the intention to 'use science to build bridges between countries and to use science as a central element of foreign policy'. It launched *Science and Diplomacy* in 2012. In 2010 the two associations jointly produced a Report that has had strong influence on thinking about science diplomacy.

The RS/AAAS Report offered a taxonomy of three types of science diplomacy; distinguishing between (i) 'science *in* diplomacy', where scientific advice is used to inform foreign policy; (ii) 'diplomacy *for* science' whereby political resources are deployed to advance scientific research; and (iii) finally, 'science *for* diplomacy', whereby scientific cooperation is used to improve international relations (Royal Society, 2010.) But it is diplomacy *for* science that drives most contemporary science diplomacy initiatives worldwide, especially from a governmental perspective. Diplomacy *for* science, implicitly if not always explicitly, aims to secure both home governmental and national private sector competitive advantage in the increasingly global scramble for influence and impact. The aim

is to tap into research knowledge and to secure those resources, material and human needed to remain (or become) global players of influence. Science and technology in this definition are regarded as resources that can improve the national capacity. It is thus driven by the self-interest of states and if necessary they will engage in ‘talent wars’. Most countries acknowledge the imperative for trans-border cooperation in science as a way to enhance R&D capacity.

While diplomacy *for* science may predominate in government, science *for* diplomacy is no trivial component of foreign policy thinking. States can also use scientific exchange and technical cooperation to build trust and transparency. Science in this definition is regarded as a tool to build and improve relations between states. The Royal Society and the AAAS, for example, do not operate in an institutional vacuum. The *Global Network of Science Academies* ([IAP](#)) brings together the world’s national sciences academies with the aim of providing ‘high quality independent advice on science related issues to government and society’. Its European members have their own group (the European Academies Science Advisory Council ([EASAC](#)) (see also Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, 2013; Swire, 2014; Yakushiji, 2009; and Chalecki, 2008.) The UK runs its own government sponsored Science Innovation Network that has as part of its mission the encouragement of ‘... high level science cooperation to benefit the UK’ ([UK Science and Innovation Network](#)). Many other EU Member States have similar schemes. State interests also exist alongside wide inter-state activities in umbrella bodies such as the International Council for Science (ICSU) and the International Social Science Council (ISSC).

Finally, in the AAAS/RS definition of Science *in* Diplomacy, scientists are prompted towards supporting foreign policy. In times of war this has resulted in mobilizing national scientific and technological resources for the development of arms and defence capacity. In times of peace, this is more about using scientific knowledge to promote foreign policy decisions.

Institutional participants in these different communities often stress the particular role they play in contemporary science diplomacy. This role is seen not simply as informative but also having brokerage functions and acting as alternative routes to dialogue in times of tension in specific inter-state relations (Royal Society, 2010: vii). Some of this activity is of course little more than symbolic. To assume science diplomacy carries out such functions in a non-problematic manner, in effect as a pure public good rather than as a club good, begs several questions. Science diplomacy is more than just international cooperation charged with

advancing science. It is a vehicle of state influence in circumstances where other avenues are thwarted. Science diplomacy, *qua* diplomacy, when driven by government has a direct relationship with the notion of national interest: it resembles other forms of diplomacy that aim to sway foreign opinion and influence policy decisions made by other states. Science *for* diplomacy and diplomacy *for* science are, in effect two ends of a continuum with Science *in* Diplomacy somewhere in the middle.

Often of greater importance than the public narratives of science diplomacy are those narratives that sit behind the public rhetoric. It is only by identifying the less public narratives that we can see a paradox at work: while the deepening of the processes of globalization has made the world more interconnected and seemingly ‘smaller’, and while many of the policy challenges are trans-border in nature, much of the policy activity is also becoming more disaggregated and networked (Slaughter, 2004; Stone, 2013). Many trans-border policy challenges require the best science available, implemented cooperatively through networks of collaboration, to secure the appropriate collective action policy responses. The driver is increasingly global sustainability of which the core components are:

- i. Managing the ‘global commons’ (especially environmental management and the need to address enhanced prospects of environmental disaster in what Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom (1990) calls ‘common pool resource’ problems in the atmosphere, oceans and polar regions;
- ii. Advancing agricultural research to ensure food security and poverty reduction;
- iii. Managing nuclear disarmament or, at the very least, maintaining non-proliferation;
- iv. Enhancing global health management (especially child health and child survival) and containing the spread of infectious diseases;
- v. Energy and resources policy.

But these challenges in turn face their own (methodological, analytical and political) challenges that confront collaboration and collective action problem solving in science diplomacy. Science is not ‘above’ politics. It also influences how actors observe, interpret and reason in particular social settings (Campbell and Pedersen, 2001: 9). In this context, ‘science diplomacy’ performs both *coordinating* functions between national and transnational policy communities on the one hand and *communicative* functions between policy makers and publics on the other (Schmidt, 2008: 310).

And while science *qua* science can be a-political, R&D in S&T can be very politicized. Science diplomacy needs to be distinguished from international collaboration between scientists that takes place as part and parcel of the normal, usually mutually beneficial advancement of scientific discovery, and in which international scientific collaborations (though universities and national laboratories) is now an essential part of ‘big science’ (prime examples being the Hadron Collider at CERN and the Square Kilometer Array ([SKA Telescope website](#))).

We should not lose sight of the increasingly complex array of actors involved in science diplomacy: especially philanthropic foundations, business groups, industrial corporations, international organizations and transnational policy networks. Large philanthropic foundations have long been influential in the formulation of scientific networks and as sources of finance for science, development, higher education and cross-cultural interaction. For example, the Rockefeller Foundation was central in the early expansion of the international health architecture. In the late 1990s, it funded and brokered product development partnerships (PDPs) for the International AIDS Vaccine Initiative (IAVI), with the pharmaceutical industry, the public sector and IOs to leverage health technologies focused on developing country needs (Moran, 2014). The Ford Foundation played a key role advancing the Green Revolution in agriculture and the establishment of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGAIR) (Herdt, 2012). Through the 2000s technology sector actors such as the Skoll Foundation and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) emerged as major institutional players that complemented—and challenged—the established health architecture.<sup>4</sup>

Bestowed with scientific status, transnational policy networks (TPNs) have also become important parts of the global health governance architecture where they wield epistemic authority via their capacity to define the dimensions of policy problems and routes of amelioration. Other kinds of transnational policy partnerships, focusing on the diffusion of expertise in a range of policy areas, to developing and transition countries, have been established by the George Soros funded Open Society Foundation (OSF) (Moran and Stone, 2015).

Thus trans-national actors complicate a simple binary relationship between national scientists and national governments. The institutional landscape of science diplomacy has become a

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<sup>4</sup> We are grateful to Diane Stone for help with this discussion of networked science diplomacy

much more complex and diversified ecology of actors and interests. Science diplomacy does not connect only with foreign policy. It also becomes entangled with other multilateral collaborations that exist between international organizations (such as the joint convening of the IPCC by the WMO and UNEP). It is also entwined with global public private partnerships and transnational policy networks that populate the global and regional landscapes and of which the EU, is increasingly a partner and sponsor.

Indeed, largely as a result of recognizing these practices, the European Commission has sponsored the growth of some transnational policy networks (TPNs) and acts as a partner to numerous global programmes and partnerships. This multi-faceted nature of interaction defies generalization. The patronage, financing, management and monitoring that the EU may play with some TPNs mirrors its differentiated polity structure and complex network of committees that gives it a natural affinity with TPNs (see Kingah et al., 2015). While the EU coordinates with many TPNs, there are also TPNs that are in competition with those that it supports. There are also TPNs that present policy visions and values that could be considered in conflict with those of the EU.

But by contrast to the non-state driven collaborative activities of philanthropic agencies and networks, science diplomacy understood as state-based and statist activity is a different kind of collaboration. States recognize that science can matter to foreign policy: especially as ‘soft power’ in the advancement of state interests (Nye, 2005). Mutual reciprocity is part of this process but not axiomatic. Technological innovation is potentially lucrative and states want to keep patents under control. So theory and practice may not always align. Europe may be a leader in the production of SET/STEM knowledge, but as is recognized by STAC (2014) it remains weak on innovation when it comes to translating that knowledge into economic and social benefit notwithstanding that innovation policy has come to play an increasingly important role in the policy decisions made by states and how interact. It becomes an important part of any conversation about science and also, as the next section suggests, cultural diplomacy.

#### ***(iv) Cultural Diplomacy***

Cultural practices have both material and politico-strategic value and all can serve as mediums for cultural diplomacy. Cultural activity and organization long ago escaped the boundaries of the state. Cultural dialogue and cultural exchange are serious elements of the contemporary transnational and trans-continental diplomatic conversation and have been

identified as particularly important for the EU across all facets of the cultural spectrum. The *Preparatory Action* report on the role of culture in the EU's external relations (EU, 2014a: 8) stresses the growing salience for the EU of mutual learning and mutual sharing in what it calls 'global cultural citizenship'. The Report recognizes the increasing role of private sector actors, notably philanthropic organizations, corporate sponsors and private higher education providers, and other cultural practices that can offer '... huge potential for enhancing European influence and attraction' (EU, 2014a: 9). Culture, says the Report '... has entered the heart of international relations thinking as a major public policy issue' (EU, 2014a: 18).

In some ways, the practices of cultural diplomacy seem less state directed than science diplomacy, yet in other ways more so. Unstructured and undirected influence is at its strongest in cultural industries especially art, music, cinema and theatre. But cultural diplomacy undertaken at the behest of and by government becomes an arm of public diplomacy, whereby the target of diplomatic efforts is the general public – or sections thereof – in the partner state, rather than its simply government officials. If cultural diplomacy is state-driven and in the service of the state, and using the popular cliché, it can also be an arm of a state's 'soft power'. But government-funded cultural interaction, as an essential ingredient of public diplomacy, is in many ways being left behind by advances in communications and the growing activities of networks, non-governmental organizations and social media (for a discussion see Melissen, 2012).

We need to distinguish public diplomacy—with its governmental constrained remits, tendency for risk avoidance and desire to advance the interests of the state—from the often more fleet of foot and edgy activities of advocacy-oriented NGOs and networks for whom diplomatic practices and activity is an increasingly important tool (Stone, 2013). New communicative technologies and the growth of networks and civic and epistemic action have taken public diplomacy to a new level. These non-state actors *can* collaborate with the state but they do not always do so and indeed, they often demonstrate substantial independence in the pursuit of their own goals that may be at odds with state interests. State agencies recognize the increasingly important need to interact with wider publics, rather than traditional smaller elites, in their diplomacy. Their messages increasingly need to reach wider and deeper into society in the 21<sup>st</sup> century than was the case in earlier times. The increase salience of non-state driven public diplomacy changes the nature of the relationship between state and non-state actors.

While all diplomatic messages are ‘social communications with meanings attached’ (Jönsson and Hall, 2005: 67) there is much more ambiguity engaged in the practices of cultural communication than those of science communication. In cultural diplomacy communication is the carriage of thoughts and ideas, often via metaphor (where meaning can be problematic or contested). Meaning does not explicitly reside in the message whereas in science the meaning of the message is usually less open to interpretation (Bhabha, 1994). By contrast there are often boundaries of self-organization in science that have no equivalent in culture. Culture is more open and accessible (in theory at least) and influence and reciprocal knowledge sharing in cultural diplomacy is often far less assured than in science diplomacy. Of course, science and culture can clash; for example when scientific consensus and the evidence base is strong, but local cultural, and political, perspectives and practices can prevail over the science; an example being the political resistance to HIV/AIDS prevention in South Africa in the previous decade. Thus cultural diplomacy and science diplomacy must be seen as two different activities; or perhaps more precisely two different modes of the same activity.

Cultural diplomacy is as important element of public diplomacy as science diplomacy; especially when politico-ideological, influences can also come into play. During the Cold War superpower science diplomacy was very much diplomacy of the traditional ‘eyes and ears’, ‘government mouthpiece’, ‘signaling’ variety and an extension of both superpower politics and intelligence gathering and propaganda. By contrast cultural diplomacy was, to coin a phrase from the past, about ‘winning the hearts and minds of the people.’ On this reading, the influence of culture as a way of life can be more influential than brute military power. Ways of life—represented by icons, habits, labels and especially social practices--can serve as selling points for a country’s culture: reliability and craftsmanship in Germany, taste and fashion in Italy, music and theatre in the UK, cinema in the US. After the Cold War, it was suggested that knowledge of western material culture and consumption patterns beamed through the Iron Curtain undermined the Soviet project as much as the nuclear arms race (Skolnikoff, 1993: 96-102).

If cultural diplomacy, facilitated by scientific innovation—radio and television—was important in reaching out to Soviet and Eastern European citizens in that historical period, the concept of cultural diplomacy nevertheless still carries with it connotations of ‘western’ superiority which do not play well in all parts of the world. Cultural diplomacy needs continual ‘re-mapping’ in the 21<sup>st</sup> century to escape the simplicities and certainties of the

Cold War era (Treverton, 2015: xi). Re-mapping implies not only understanding what we mean by culture but also the language we use to promote it in the context of cultural diplomatic initiatives. Without re-mapping, legacies of resentment will remain.

It might now be much less so the case, but European states have had a long tradition of letting other states know when they did not match up to its (European) ‘standards’ (not being modern or developed; not being secular or Christian; not being democratic). Europe has not been alone in this tradition of course. The USA too has a track record. But their activities have left a long-standing, and in many instances still present, sense of resentment; especially in European post-colonial states. This has been demonstrated in historical studies of Turkey after WW, Japan after WWII, and the contemporary case of Russia after the Cold War (Zarakol, 2011). Foreign policy has been, and is, shaped accordingly. It has led at best to legacies of status deprivation and a sense of national shame through to the contemporary responses of alienated groups resorting, increasingly in some contexts, to acts of violence.

Practices in the field of culture, like science, often operate informally and incorporate a wide range of actors. Academics and intellectuals, journalists, business elites, members of the artistic community as well as government officials and political leaders ‘acting in their private capacity’ in a range of issue areas (Jones, 2008: 2). While they also reach out to wider publics, more exclusive dialogues often takes place through research institutes, think tanks and business roundtables that provide the ‘neutral space’ outside the architecture of the state for the conduct of informal diplomacy. Cultural diplomacy, again not unlike science collaboration, has developed umbrella organizations that, to greater or lesser extents, shape practice. The role of the Council of Europe and UNESCO, though not without their critics, and although evidence of influence is invariably more anecdotal than systematic, play a major role. Also, and perhaps more quietly significant in Europe, again on a qualitative reading of its activities, is the European Council for Institutes of Culture ([EUNIC](#)), formed in 2006. In many ways, it mirrors the activities of EASAC for science. Working with, but at a distance from, public officialdom, it promotes cultural interaction for its 33 members from 27 European countries.

One key consideration in our identification of the practice turn in cultural (and science diplomacy) is the growth of informal practices often delineated into different ‘tracks’ to account for the varying degree of engagement with official actors. Track One (T1) diplomacy reflects the diplomatic efforts of bureaucrats to represent government or resolve conflicts

through the official channels of government. Track Two (T2) reflects a blurring of the traditional distinctions between foreign policy making and domestic policies as well as the powerful role played by corporate and other non-state actors in world affairs. T2 dialogues are often facilitated by (ostensibly) impartial third parties with semi or informal connections to their respective official communities; foreign policy think-tanks for example. Track Three (T3) diplomacy occurs among civil society groups and is more strictly non-governmental. It is more akin to the idea of 'citizen diplomacy'. T3 is a set communicative practices and discourses that experts and policy makers develop with the public. The stress is on long-term, deep intercultural engagement.

We should also add into this mix the concept of Track One-and-a-Half diplomacy (T1½) a term used to identify discussions between T2 and the official diplomatic community. In this instance, the diplomat is usually '... an ex-official who meets on behalf of his country with other nations' officials' (Homans, 2011). Thus T1, T1½, T2 and T3 are points on spectrum from exclusively state (often confidential) processes, through to non-state public practices at the other. With varying understandings of the terms in different political cultures, and recognizing that T2 can transform into T1, Capie and Taylor show (2010: 365–67 discourses see also Kerr, 2012) how practices have been developed to a high level of sophistication in East Asia where newly emerging public and private sector elites have been keen to expand the nature of contacts and cooperative.

Some practices of cross-cultural dialogue that have developed in Europe in recent years reflect these organizational elements of this semi-formalized diplomacy. The creation of the Asia Europe Foundation (ASEF), for example, incorporates activities at all levels. ASEF, following on the back of the creation of ASEM, was a product reflecting a European desire for greater public engagement of Europe with Asia across a spectrum of areas in which science, arts and culture, education are prominent. To the extent that it has survived and extended and diversified its remit ASEF has seemingly worked well. This should not be thought to be axiomatically the case everywhere. EU state-led exercises in cultural diplomacy are always going to be difficult in the contemporary era. Target audiences, especially in parts of the Middle East and the developing world can, and often do, treat cultural diplomacy with suspicion. As a consequence, cynics might be forgiven for thinking that at times, the practices are more significant than the substances that emanates from them.

Science diplomacy often operates alongside the pursuit of multiple and shifting social, economic and cultural objectives in public diplomacy (Wilson, 2015; Cull, 2008). The ‘invisible colleges’, trade in higher education services, the globalization of the university and technical development assistance are all activities we can call science and cultural diplomacy. Educational exchange is a long standing tradition which has been seen in activities like the Fulbright Program, Rhodes scholarships, the Colombo Plan and ‘New’ Colombo Plan in the Anglo-sphere (Wilson, 2015). The Colombo Plan in particular was always hinged to foreign policy objectives. Its genesis was as a multilateral fund supported by the Commonwealth and the US to help the governments of Southeast Asia battle communism; it was a ‘Cold War tool’ (Akita *et al*, 2014). Also in the Cold War context, the cultural diplomacy of the Congress for Cultural Freedom and the Fondation pour une Entraide Intellectuelle Européenne aided and abetted ‘the intellectual network building that contributed to the emergence of new political and cultural elites in Eastern Europe’ (Guilhot, 2006: 408). And only recently, and much more covertly, the US intelligence establishment used an exercise in science diplomacy as a cover in the pursuit of Osama bin Laden.

This preceding narrative tells us that cultural diplomatic practices can be put to extensive use, but that they can also subjective and problematic tools at times when their mission is confused. Culture, norms and values are not the same thing. Culture, from its German origins meaning ‘self-realization’, reflects a society’s historically determined, moral, religious and national beliefs. Norms influence the prescriptive practices of actors. They are culturally determined. One culture does not set the course of action for another. Cultural dialogues are usually about norms as practice, not values, and they are adaptive (Crow, 2011: 6-11). It is the evolving nature of norms that makes cultural diplomacy a difficult and at times unpredictable instrument in the pursuit of a state’s foreign policy.

In this context, the linked concepts of cultural dialogue and cultural diplomacy can be misnomers. Disagreements, even among allies, over norms are not unusual, even if the broad value base is more or less the same, as Crow illustrates with regards to the Atlantic alliance. At the heart of ‘Western’ culture we may find a set of shared values—including commitments to a market economy, some kind of ‘liberal’ democracy, religious tolerance and a free press—notwithstanding that we may disagree about the norms-as-practice for delivering them. But do these values amount to a common European cultural persona, space of meaning or set of normative practices that transcend national boundaries? Can they be the basis for the

development of a common cultural identity and by extension a more joined up cultural diplomacy? To suggest they can is a heroic call. The answer must be more nuanced

A *core* of support for such values is not the same as *universal* support; especially amongst the increasingly diverse communities of the EU. Moreover, attempting to merely consolidate a European understanding of its own common core of values is one thing. Trying to universalize them through cultural diplomacy to other parts of the world. European cultural diplomacy is an endeavor of a different order of magnitude and probably is destined to fail. This is especially so if its message to the peoples and states beyond the borders of the EU is that European—let alone ‘Trans-Atlantic’—values are pivotal to the smooth functioning of international society in the modern era. Of course, Europe needs some consensus around its own values. But a battle over values—asking the question if there are any universal values—is proving disruptive both within and beyond its borders. It is asking too much of those European norms and values developed from the Enlightenment culture—especially a crusading desire to export democratic values—to expect that they should be automatically universalisable in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

To argue that European values are not universalisable is not to advocate cultural relativism. Understanding societies within their own framework is important but, as anthropologists tell us, it does not mean ‘anything goes’. At the very least, demands of human dignity and the in-principle sanctity of life should remain non-negotiable and their violation resisted and condemned. As we have seen with the rise of ISIS and its affiliates, there are groups of actors for whom no amount of cultural latitude would be sufficient. Disagreements with extra-European partners over issues of values will from time to time inevitably lead to the suspension of cultural dialogues. How to sustain that dialogue and provide space for diversity of expression both internal and external to the Union, and without lapsing into cultural relativism, is the central philosophical and conceptual issue that casts a massive policy shadow over the practice of cultural diplomacy in the early 21st century.

### **By way of Conclusion: Towards a Research Agenda for European Science and Cultural Diplomacy**

As we have tried to suggest in this paper, joining up the theory and practice of diplomacy is no easy task. Traditional research and writing has been largely historical and (auto)

biographical. Some recent scholarly work on diplomacy, for all its discursive theoretical sophistication (see for example Sending and Neumann, 2010 and Neumann, 2012), does not lend itself readily to applied policy analysis. This is unfortunate, it is clear that some modern streams of discourse analysis are ideally suited for the deep interrogation of modern diplomatic practice (see for example Adler Nissen (2015 and Carta, 2016). But very little work is both policy applied *and* theoretically informed. Again, as we have tried to suggest, this is the case in both the study of diplomacy generally and in science and cultural diplomacy particularly. And, if this is the case generally it is also particular so in a European context.

By way of corrective we have offered the beginning of an approach that suggests the utility of privileging diplomacy as practice—the practice turn—as a way to better understand European cultural and science diplomacy than a structuralist approach. Of course, to assert this turn it is not to prove it. We have provided some some evidence but more research needs to be undertaken to test this proposition robustly.

At this stage we want to stress that cultural diplomacy’ and ‘science diplomacy’ are *labels* used by actors to refer to certain policies or actions that involve the engagement of scientific or cultural communities in transnational interaction. The study of cultural and science diplomacy therefore reflects both the study of *policy that refers to culture and/or science in the context of external relations as well as the study of practices* of scientific or cultural communities that are of a transnational nature. This can be labeled as *explicit CSD diplomacy* where the actors involved intentionally talk about it as such. When not labeled as such, we can refer to it as *implicit diplomacy*., that is as practices where the actors involved themselves do not use the CSD label. Following a model developed by Kingah and Van Langenhove (2012.) and by Zwartjes *et. al.* (2012), future research will need to identify three core components of the practice turn in cultural and science diplomacy in particular and indeed diplomacy in general:

- (i) The **willingness** of the actors to use culture and science for diplomatic goals. This involves mapping the ambitions of the actors and an analysis of how CSD policy interacts with other elements—notably security and economics--of foreign policy.
- (ii) The **capacity** of the actors to mobilize culture and science for diplomatic goals. This involves mapping the resources and instruments available to actors.

- (iii) The *acceptance* of CSD policies: including not only the scientific and cultural communities but other members of the foreign policy community..

These conceptual lenses, allow us to take into account that CSD is not necessarily without internal contradictions. For instance, just because a policy community is willing to engage in CSD, it will not automatically be accepted as such by the involved cultural or scientific communities. Furthermore, even if there is acceptance, the question remains what the capacities of the community might be. The same holds in reverse. Initiatives that emerge from the scientific and cultural communities: they can be either accepted or contested by the relevant policy-making community.

For sure, at a policy level the EU has made a major start articulating the relevance of culture and science for its external relations. As indicated in this paper, some of the EU's analysis of scientific work and its *Preparatory Action* on cultural diplomacy have been leading edge. What has yet to be done, however, is to make explicit the theoretical assumptions underpinning much of the practice of European cultural and science diplomacy and to codify and articulate it as part of a systematic and strategic approach to understanding the direction of travel of science and cultural diplomacy within both global and EU contexts and especially how the EU and the member states might collectively and individually develop a good/better institutional and strategic policy environment for extra-regional culture and science diplomacy—if such a course of action is in fact possible in the immediate contemporary era.

For this to happen not only scholars will need to be more systemically analytic and policy focused, but policy makers will need to comprehend and manage a spectrum of opinion in both domains. In science policy this spectrum stretches from the complacent to the zealous—from the 'technology will solve all' through to views skeptical or fearful of, or irrationally hostile to, technological innovation. In a cultural context that stretches from a commitment to the promotion of diversity and cultural understanding at one end through to those left/skeptical of cultural imperialism on the one hand and those right/skeptical of 'identity dilution' on the other. Paradoxically, science and cultural diplomacy as vehicles for learning and cooperation are attaining a greater policy importance at the very time when the prospects for such cooperation and interaction are coming under increasing challenge both within the confines of the EU and indeed globally. In this context European science and cultural

diplomacy represent important areas for research and analysis in their own right. Several specific areas are ripe for further inquiry:

- (i) Analysis of the links between Europe's aspirational role as a continuing global actor and its need to enhance science cooperation and cultural dialogue with its key international and regional partners. This is clearly a comparative question that needs to be located within a global context populated by crises and significant actors. Major member states of the EU (notably France, Germany and the UK) already have a long and established tradition in this field as do other global players, notably the USA and China, respectively the longstanding leader and the emerging challenger in these fields.
- (ii) Clearly there is also a 'levels of analysis' question to be addressed. Foreign policy and research objectives in a sovereign sensitive world are pursued by different states, public bodies and transnational actors in national, sub-national and global domains: that is the pursuit of 'science *for* diplomacy' as well as that of 'diplomacy *for* science' in the words of the Royal Society/American Academy for the Advancement of Science Report, *Science Diplomacy* (2010).
- (iii) In addition to the activities of states, there is a massive transnational collaborative dynamic in cultural and science diplomacy and particularly the rapid expansion in the activities of private actors and international organizations and networks such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, UNESCO, the Vaccine Alliance (GAVI), EIROforum and the global and regional development banks--major players in science diplomacy and education. All these practices are in need of both greater systematic and systemic analysis.
- (iv) We also need, perhaps most importantly, to hold up a mirror to EU cultural and science diplomacy, looking at EU policy initiatives from the 'outside-in'. What EU partners think of its activities in these areas needs to be better understood especially if the developing practices of cultural and science diplomacy are to bridge gaps in inter-cultural relations rather than exacerbate them. 'Europeans must be willing to ask the 'Other' what (s) he really wants' (EU, 2014: 9).
- (v) Research on EU cultural and science diplomacy must explore the institutional and organizational 'intel' that underpins the EU's cultural and scientific diplomatic actions, both in Brussels (increasingly the European External Action Service) and the Delegations.

In this paper we have argued that SCD should be regarded as *praxis* in international relations. To do so will allow us:

- (i) To look at SCD from a different theoretical perspective than has traditionally been the case in IR scholarship
- (ii) To provide a stronger methodological context for the analysis of SCD.
- (iii) To provide a framework for a more precise comparative study of specific initiatives in cultural and science diplomacy.

Taken together, these approaches might contribute to not only an improvement of SCD scholarship but also to the development of SCD as a relevant foreign policy instrument for the EU. The first of these contributions is our aspiration the second is only a contribution should the policy community choose to treat it as such. This distinction is important; not all scholars would agree that attempts to develop a policy utility out of scholarly analysis, especially in international relations, is necessarily a good thing. Indeed, as Andrew Hurrell (2011) argues, there is a deeply problematic relationship between theory and practice in international relations. While we are not unaware of this tension nor of the problems that can occur when we try to weave scholarly analysis and policy together; especially the manner in which temporal expedience emanating from the policy world can skew academic inquiry. And the current and growing interest in cultural and science diplomacy in the European Commission would clearly reflect these temporal pressures—if that were all we were responding to in this paper—but that is not what we are doing. Rather we have identified a transformation in both the theory and practice of diplomacy. And while we are not acting as handmaidens of public policy we are not unaware that our analysis may indeed cast policy shadows. Identifying these policy shadows is one thing. Making recommendations on the basis of them is another. But we are, we hope, offering analytical and theoretical insight and indeed a research agenda for the study of cultural and science diplomacy. Should that turn out to be used as a blueprint of legitimacy and authority for the policy community so be it.

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